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Abstract
This paper examines the concept of explanatory adequacy and addresses some
of the problems triggered by rapid theoretical paradigm shifts that occurred in
linguistics in the twentieth century. Concurrently, it also examines and com-
ments on some of the difficulties which have inevitably arisen due to a noisy
terminological landscape that makes it difficult to formulate, let alone evaluate,
theories and hypotheses for their explanatory force. A concept of languaging
is introduced which encompasses the information-based approach to linguis-
tics that underlies Discourse Information Grammar, a cognitive pragmatically-
based and usage-based approach to the scientific study of language and cogni-
tion.
1. INTRODUCTION
Chomsky's work has been remarkable and revolutionary for many different reasons,
the most important of which is the cognitive revolution that his work has triggered
in the social scientific, scientific and humanistic disciplines focused on language.
The introduction of a cognitive approach to the study of language has had many
implications, among which are the opening up of empirical studies using formal
and semi-formal models. Moreover, given that semi-formal and formal models are
based upon increasingly precise characterizations, coupled with rigorous demands
placed on definitions and analyses of results and hypotheses, the model-based ap-
proach is forcing researchers to re-examine many concepts which have traditionally
been either assumed or simply glossed over. Of course, even empirical methods
can differ or indeed clash, but providing all efforts are sincere and consistent, such
differences are welcome since they enable us to engage in verifiable, meaningful
debates concerning the foundations of the theory, its first principles and its explana-
tory power. Advances in non-invasive brain imaging technology have made it pos-
sible to study language cognition in a more direct fashion, permitting researchers
to better link linguistic behaviours to their biological (neural) substrate.
Hornstein (1998: I) summarized Chomsky's work on the problem of adequacy
in grammar when he wrote:
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Chomsky 1as fundamentally restructured grammatical research. Due
to his wor ( the central object of study in linguistics is "the language
faculty", a postulated mental organ that is dedicated to acquiring lin-
guistic km ,wledgeJ and is involved in various aspects oflanguage-use,
including Ihe production and understanding of utterances. The aim of
linguistic Iheory is to describe the initial state of this faculty and how
it changes with exposure to linguistic data.
As Anderson an 1Lightfoot (2002) point out, the shift which Chomsky triggered
gave linguistics and linguistic theory a new definition, a new focus, new goals
and new compon ents by re-orienting fundamental linguistic activity from the struc-
turalist preoccup ltion with external and socially-derived E-language and its various
concrete forms t(1a focus on internal, personalized I-language with a focus on bio-
logical and ment,l1ist phenomena. In essence, Chomsky has claimed linguistics as
part of biology aid has taken the initiative to extract it from the humanities.2 This
conception fits It.e agenda of formal and/or computational approaches. Should this
reorientation pro ve workable and/or correct, it will have contributed considerably
to providing a W! Irking definition for the discipline of Linguistics,3 a much needed
definition that C( ,ntinues to be problematic. Predictably, not everyone is pleased
with the new apI'roach and goals, and yet, currently, much of the effort expended
by linguistic the( 'rists is focused on describing and defining the initial state of the
language faculty or organ. Specifically, much effort is being put forth to begin to
describe how the "initial state" of the language "organ" changes with exposure to
actual linguistic data.4 This effort has not been without its own difficulties. For
instance, in 1981 Chomsky characterized the initial state of the language faculty in
terms of a set of Jrinciples and parameters. Language acquisition was viewed as a
process during which the possibility of setting these open parameter values on the
basis of (incomp ete) linguistic data was universally available to a child. The pre-
parametrized init al state of the system was viewed as a Universal Grammar (UG): a
supeNecipe for ( oncocting language-specific grammars. These grammars, in turn,
constitute the act!mlized and concrete knowledge of particular languages that result
as parametric val Jes become fixed. In 1995, the Minimalist Program simplified the
approach to the I roblem of language acquisition and the development of specific,
lOne of the reamns for writing this paper is specifically to clarify what is referred to by
this term. In sectio IS2 and 4, there are additional comments on the lack of a clear referent
implied by this and other terms.
2Some would ague that he has spurred a redefinition of the humanities. This is to be
seen in the large a:Id growing literature of cognitive scientists working in fields that have
traditionally been t Ie purview of the humanities and social sciences, such as cognitive an-
thropology, literai') criticism, sociology, communication studies, music and art cognition,
etc.
31use the big-L version to speak of the field as a coherent entity and movement here.
4See sections 2 and 4 for comments on the lack of a clear referent implied by this term.
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feature-based, lexicalist grammars, but the overall goal of describing and account-
ing for the language organ remained unaltered.
Given these goals and views, linguistic theory has a double mission. First, it
aims to "adequately" characterize the grammars (and hence the mental states) at-
tained by native speakers. Theories are "descriptively adequate" if they attain this
characterization with sufficient accuracy as to exclude utterances which fall outside
the range of acceptable productions. In addition, linguistic theory also needs to ad-
dress the problem of explaining how such grammatical competence is attained. An
immediate by-product of explanatory adequacy is to generate a principled way of
choosing between two grammars generated by the same data set. 5 To cite Chomsky
(2000: 7):
A genuine theory of language has to satisfy two conditions: "descrip-
tive adequacy" and "explanatory adequacy". The grammar of a partic-
ular language satisfies the condition of descriptive adequacy insomuch
as it gives a full and accurate account of the properties of the language,
of what the speaker of the language knows. To satisfy the condition of
explanatory adequacy, a theory of language must show how each par-
ticular language can be derived from a uniform initial state under the
"boundary conditions" set by experience.
This approach to explanatory adequacy rests on an articulated theory of UG, and,
in particular, a detailed theory of the general principles and open parameters that
characterize the initial state of the language faculty, that is, "the set of mental habits
and structures or patterns each (normal) person is presumed to receive genetically"
(Hornstein 1998: 1).
As mentioned above, Chomsky's research has further led to the postulate that
each human possesses an I-language where "I" stands for "internal", "individual"
and "intensional" (Chomsky 2002). As an indication of the current reorientation of
linguistic theory, it is interesting to note that such traditionally important individual
language communities as "Latin", "French" or "English" have been demoted, in
the new linguistics, to mere collections of idiosyncrasies which Chomsky treats
as epiphenomenal, at best objects which the I-language generically specifies. So
far, we have introduced two questions which Chomsky's program explores: "What
are the properties of language?" and "How might they be described?" Chomsky
(2001) has raised a third question: "Why are language properties the way they are?"
The answer to this last question entails going "beyond explanatory adequacy", as
discussed in section 5.
Finally, I note that in his approach to language, Chomsky advocates using a
rationalist approach and a conception of mind that can be modelled using math-
ematical constructs. One of his aims is to provide falsifiable models of language
5In this case, the data set in question is "primary linguistic data" which is the data chil-
dren are exposed to and use in attaining their native grammars.
~l.•
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structure and or erations that presumably will also reflect cognitive reality by cap-
turing analogou s processes and structures in the brain. This aspect of Chomsky's
program is tantomount to requiring that linguistic theory seek to provide three gen-
eral models (1):
(I) a. a modd of language structure, including initial state phenomena
b. a modd oflanguage acquisition, including initial state interfaces with given data
and initial state developments until linguistic developmentalmaturity occurs, ev-
idently at Ornear puberty
c. a (part:al) model of the brain's linguistic activities
The Chomskian program is exciting and ambitious notwithstanding many difficult
problems still tc be overcome. Among these, it is important to address the current
reality that then: are many instances where key terms are defined either insuffi-
ciently and/or if consistently or defined in ways that do not appear to be convinc-
ingly falsifiable. This leads to methodological and theoretical inconsistencies that
require c1arifical ion given the fundamental role that modelling has been assigned
in the biolingui~ tic program. A few of these problematic terms will be dealt with
briefly in the ne):t section.
2. PROBLEMS 'NITH BASIC TERMS OF REFERENCE
First, we need to be more specific about the nature and representation of "actual Iin-
guistic data", "lillguistic knowledge" and "primary linguistic data". It is also critical
that we represen t and define processes underlying such expressions as "production
and understandi 19 of utterances", including "initial state changes". It would be
much easier if tt.ese concepts were self-evident, but such is not the case. If it were
so, then we wou.d know conclusively what the process of "languaging"6 involves.
However, given Ihe range and variety of theoretical work currently underway, there
does not seetn to be much of a consensuS on this matter. For instance, there is little
consensus on the essential nature and use of language (2).
(2) Does langu,lgeproper include all of the following:
a. phontties
b. morp 1OIogy
c. syntal
d. semallties
e. pragnlaties
f. know edge and information
g. neura and/or other cognitive processes
61amusing the term "languaging" as a convenient short form for the clumsy expressions
"the process or precesses whieh result in the product we refer to as language" and "the use
of language and its result(s)".
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Or does language include only a subset of this list, or possibly even a different
list? Moreover, we may ask whether the interfaces between language per se and
the cognitive/pragmatic contexts are to be included as part of language or just as
an interlayer glue of some sort? These are difficult questions and the fact that there
are, at present, no universal solutions to them indicates that linguists, just like other
scientists, must deal with describing elusive phenomena. This is nothing new. For
instance, physicists do not agree on what exactly constitutes or defines electricity
(a discrete phenomenon? a wave? both?). Yet, science has managed to be able to
predict a great deal of the behaviour and side-effects of electrical phenomena. To do
so, it has had to formulate various (reasonably) consistent hypotheses and develop
units of measurement, as well as adequate conceptual building blocks. It is interest-
ing and relevant to this paper that these building blocks and units of measurement
(volt, ampere, watt, etc.) are not electricity itself, but mere tools developed to help
us understand the use of electricity and predict its behaviour. In linguistics, we are,
at best, at the same level. Thus, such terms as "linguistic knowledge", "actual lin-
guistic data", "linguistic data" and "primary linguistic data", "understanding and
representation of utterances" need to be clearly formulated in terms of what they
are intended to be: either bits of language itself or mere concepts used to help us
understand the nature, functioning and limits of language. When we say that a child
develops his/her grammar from "primary linguistic data", it becomes essential that
everyone understand what is being referred to (3).
(3) Is the reference to:
a. genetically hardwired cognitive processes?
b. intuitive understanding of how language is stored and accessed?
c. overlearned patterns stored in memory?
d. innate cognitive abilities to store, retrieve, represent and transmit concepts? etc.
There have been many theories about the nature of language, each with a different
viewpoint, each with the objective of rendering comprehensible what language is
all about. Thus far, we have made few solid gains overtradition.7 However, the last
several decades have seen progress, especially when formal modelling techniques
7When we say tradition it is important to note that it is not only grammarians and lin-
guists who have spoken intelligently about language. There has been input to the field of
"Ianguaging" from almost every human, social scientific and scientific discipline that is in-
terested in unlocking the secrets to humankind's nature. It would be important and interest-
ing to linguistics to draw a map of these various influences and contributions from across the
disciplines and see what everyone has been saying, compare it, and then winnow out con-
flictingarguments.Who is to say that there are not ideas about language put forth in cognate
fields such as philosophy, literature, communication and drama, to name a few, that could
contribute to our modelling efforts. An example of how this disciplinary cross-pollination
can work is the influence of the architect, Christopher Alexander's (1977) work in computer
science and design. I am convinced that cognitive science, in its many manifestations, is a
transdisciplinary means to achieve this end.
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and approaches have been used because such models lend themselves to making
falsifiable claim:; which can then be pushed systematically until they either break or
survive. Among the various gains that have been made is the possibility of looking
at language fron Idifferent angles.
For instance, linguistic data could and have been conceived as patterns and (hi-
erarchical) orgat jzation of structures that can be represented either as tree-structures
or as labelled br:lckets that can then be mapped onto utterances. However, as Saus-
sure pointed out, language also consists of content and contexts. This leads to the
need to effect II appings between structures and content. Again, what is the con-
tent of language? What relationships obtain among form, content, expression and
context? Is it po: ;sible to start not from form, but say, from content, or even from a
(postulated) esse ntial purpose? If so, what is the essential purpose of language (4)?
(4) a. to com nunicate with others
b. to storf concepts and expressions
c. to talk 0 oneself
d. to expr,~ssone's inner thoughts
e. none 01 the above: rather, language exists to enable any of the above, all of which
are sidl -effects of "languaging"
f. none oj the above
It is also po ;sible to ask whether there are significant differences between the
essential PUrpOSI:of language as a cognitive capacity (Saussurean langue or pos-
sibly ChomskiaIL "I-language") and those many concrete examples of individual
languages used t y people all over the world (Saussurean parole or possibly Chom-
skian "E-langual:e").1f such differences exist, what exactly are they? What units or
processes do we Ileed to develop to arrive at a satisfactory description and explana-
tion of these diff :rences?
In an attemI't to deal with some of these difficulties, we might try to identify
the components )f languaging. An immediate result was that languaging appears
to consist of eleven generic activities (5).
(5) a. storing
b. represellting
c. accessillg
d. transmi ting
e. receiviLg
f. monitO!ing
g. editing m-the-f1yor updating
h. context'lalizing
i. referem ing
j. networ~ing
k. interpre jng
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Viewed from this perspective, languaging is seen as primarily dealing with the con-
struction of mental representations based on information. It is also possible to inter-
pret the five commonly given purposes of language listed above in terms of infor-
mation processing. For example, "talking to oneself" simply involves the sending
and receiving of information with sender and receiver coinciding. This has a num-
ber of implications for linguistic theory, the most important of which deals with the
fact that the theory of syntax cannot be separated from the temporal frame of lan-
guage production. Another implication is that the primacy of syntax in the cognitive
system of language may have to be questioned. At least the conception of syntax
as a system of declarative, unordered rules. Another important implication is that
the link between language use and the theory of universal grammar may have to be
reexamined. It could be that both Chomsky's theory of universal grammar and the
time-linear processing models such as Dynamic Syntax or Discourse Information
Grammar may both be correct. Perhaps the theory of the initial state can be consid-
ered separately from the theory of human langauge production and understanding
necessary to understand language as a natural object existing in time and having a
material instantiation in the brain. The next two sections will present a sketch of the
approach used by Discourse Information Grammar (henceforth DIG) and indicate
how such an information-based approach might contribute to some of the problems
raised in this section.
3. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DISCOURSE INFORMATION GRAMMAR (DIG)
The practice of symbolic communication is a defining trait of homo sapiens. We
do this by receiving signals which are processed sequentially, in real-time. The
products of these processing activities are accumulations of information that cover
the entire range of knowledge and meaning significant to us. When we considered
these accumulations of information, four questions immediately suggested them-
selves (6).
(6) a. How do we effect these transmissions?
b. What is the nature of these transmissions?
c. What is the nature of the information being transmitted?
d. How do we learn to effect these transmissions?
Broadly speaking, there are three generic approaches that can be developed for
any or all of these questions (7).
(7) a. the analysis of the prerequisites necessary for such transmissions (ante-transmission)
b. the analysis of the transmissions themselves (intra-transmission)
c. the analysis of the products qua products (post-transmission)
Finally, the approach adopted for any or all of these analyses can be formal, semi-
formal (meaning that we adopt a system of representation that is not fully mathe-
matically specified) or informal. The research results described in section 4 use a
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semi-formal approach to analyze an example of the natural language understand-
ing process (inl ra-transmission). Focus is placed on how the processes could be
modelled and 01 what sorts of information are accumulated when the grammar is
approached frOirl an information-based time-linear perspective.
Recently, tl,ere has been a growing interest in the concept of procedural gram-
mars that model "knowledge of language" from aleft-to-right, functionalist, usage-
based perspecti\e: Dynamic Syntax (Kempson, Meyer-Viol and Gabbay 2001; Cann,
Kempson and Harten 2005), LeftAssociative Grammar (Hausser 1999), Markov
Grammar (Tugv 'ell 1998), Axiomatic Grammar (Milward 1994), Linearized Phrase
Structure Gram mar (Shin 1987) and Discourse Information Grammar (Sevigny
2002a, 2002b, :003). What distinguishes all of these approaches from the phrase
structural (PSG) tradition used in most varieties of generative grammar is the under-
lying and guidir g metaphor. PSGs are based on the metaphor that natural languages
are formallangu ages and that there exists an autonomous syntactic module (largely)
independent of 1 emantics. In contrast, the time-linear approaches see a grammar of
a language as a series of procedures permitting humans to construct partial rep-
resentations as ;L sentence is being processed and understood or (re)-constructed.
Thus, knowledg e of language is knowledge of the processes and information nec-
essary to unders tand and use the language. In the words of Tomasello (1998: xi):
Many lin! uists and psychologists believe that there is a biological ba-
sis for laltguage, just not in the form of an autonomous Generative
Grammar, Just as plausible for these linguists is the hypothesis that
language: 'ests on more general biological predispositions, such as the
abilities tCIcreate and learn symbols, to form concepts and categories,
to process information rapidly, and to interact and communicate with
other pers )ns intersubjectively.
DIG attempts to I :reate a framework within which cognitive scientists can frame and
articulate linguh tic theories that are empirically-based and psychologically plausi-
ble. It does not necessitate the a priori assumption of an independent language
module in the mnd, but does encourage hypotheses about the interplay of different
types of informa tion in the languaging process.
DIG accumillates and assembles information on the fly, in real-time. In order
to do this, it rei ies on a specialized lexicon tailored to meet the needs of linear
information accllmulation. There are specialized lexical templates for nominals,
verbs, linkers, et;. - even templates for structures of various types as well as func-
tional roles. Lex lcal entries are specified in terms of attribute-feature pairs which
may vary in degJ'ee of specification:jitll specijication, for such "hard-wired" items
as the French d{finite article la, which must be marked [+singular], [+feminine];
partial specijicaion, needed to accumulate information on the fly; underspecijied
specijication, wt ich is the usual default specification. At times, underspecified be-
comes altered to non-specijied in the case of an item which is simply left unclear
when the discou'se/utterance closes. Information accumulation proceeds word by
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word as structures are built up;8 completed structures are then functionalized by
being assigned functional roles via a small set of operators. Eventually, a mini-
mum discourse unit is built up, triggering the appearance of a local context with
primitive roles such as agent, doer, verbal relationship, complements and various
potential or realized links. As information accumulates, it is networked and seman-
tic fields, topic chains, logical structure and types are marked as initiated, on-going
or completed as the case may be. (Distant) anaphora are filled as soon as possi-
ble. Eventually, closures occur and discourse units are accumulated. These bring in
additional parameters such as discourse type.
Throughout the process, there are constant checks for feature-value compat-
ibility, link relationship updates, accumulated information updates, etc. The net
result is that the information contained in fragments and sentences is built up and
networked. At any stage, it is possible to obtain a "snapshot" of the information
state. This represents a current informational state of affairs. In reality, this models
our ability to be able to summarize information accumulated so far and be aware
that it is not yet complete. There may be incomplete or even incorrect assump-
tions and links but these may be corrected as soon as relevant information becomes
available. Again, this represents our ability to correct ourselves on the fly. Also im-
portant, especially given the severe limits of operating in real-time, is the concept
of anticipated information. In DIG, anticipated information consists of projected
potential situational and pattern developments. As such, it is based on experience,
familiarity with the information being accumulated and with overlearned patterns
stored in memory. At any given moment, this restricts the possible new develop-
ments to under a dozen possibilities in most situations. Recognition of anticipated
information "nodes" reduces the amount of decision-making and consequently re-
duces the time needed to effect such decision-making, both of which are crucial
for operating in real-time. Examples illustrating a number of these concepts are
presented in the next section.
4. DIG AND UNIVERSAL GRAMMAR
Although developed independently from generative grammar, DIG addresses a num-
ber of concerns relevant to the questions raised by the Chomskian program, espe-
cially in the area of explanatory adequacy. It also proposes a partial solution to
some problems which may be "beyond explanatory adequacy", though for differ-
ent reasons due to the different focus of the approach.
While the focus in generative grammar has been on "the language faculty"
more or less as conceived by Chomsky - that is, as a rationalist, mathematical
model (and not as an empiricist model) with concentration on brain activities as re-
8Currently, DIG uses established results from other theories, notably phrase-structure
grammar. It may well turn out, however, that these structures may be better analyzed and
represented as structures of another type, probably centered on the notion of (localized)
context.
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flected by lingui ,tic structures and mechanisms which will map onto brain activities
and functions _. DIG has developed as a result of trying to model the linear accu-
mulation of info rmation which occurs during natural language processing. This has
required that tht notion of "information" be dealt with in unambiguous, falsifiable
terms. It is DIG'; information-centric view that provides a bridge between DIG and
Chomsky's interest in problems of explanation in Linguistics. Information is con-
stant in both ap Jroaches to the study of languaging. If one accepts some version
of the representational theory of mind, it is necessary for that mind to have infor-
mation to repre! ent to itself. The mind, whether it be modular, distributed, a vast
storage-and-retreval device, comprised of central and peripheral systems, or just
one enormous n mltidimensional network of connections, or even if it is operating
along quantum 1ines, requires information to work. All of the metaphors that cog-
nitive scientists Ise to talk about the mind are information-based. Moreover, if this
is true and the 1mguage of the mind, or mental ese, as some have called it, is the
means that hum ms use to represent external reality in a set of internal states, then
those states mus. themselves find some sort of metarepresentation. The metaphor of
information and information processing carries serious and interesting research im-
plications which pose challenges to the remnants of structuralism that still permeate
linguistic theory, For, if we are indeed information-processing mammals, a sym-
bolic species, so to speak, then the notion that our mind's functioning is structured
in the Same waj that a machine is structured, that is to say that there are formu-
lae or rules that Ire somehow primordial, would appear to be the result of looking
for innatism in 1he wrong place. In an information-processing animal, the initial
state may not bt defined as a set of principles and parameters, but perhaps rather
a set of informal ional predispositions, algorithms and learning/acquisition/storage
strategies. If thi~ were true, then formal syntax ceases to be the central concern of
the theoreticallioguist-syntax remains, but is simply one stream of information
among many- md is replaced by the search for a highly abstract set of processing
and storing strati :gies which form the essence of (a) universal grammar.
4.1. DIG and e~planatory adequacy
To reiterate: the lexicon used by DIG is built from lexical entries which, in turn,
consist of comp ex structures of attribute-feature pairs, each in various stages of
feature specificaion. Example (8) shows a typical entry template for nominals (see
Sevigny 2000, 21)02a, 2003, for details):
(8) NAME: ( :
CATEGORY:
INDEX: gender [ ], number [ ], person [ ]
STRUCTUR ~-TYPE: [ ]
SEM: { ... }
The NAME. ield simply refers to the written form of a word or the phonetic
form in the case )f spoken language. Although the concept is problematic, of what
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exactly a "word" is, this difficulty will be glossed over in this paper and the tradi-
tional view of "word" will be used. Eventually, however, this problem must be ad-
dressed and solved in terms of formal representation criteria. The CATEGORY field
refers to the part of speech to which a word is assigned. In DIG homophones such as
"purchase" (verb) and "purchase" (nominal) are treated as different words. There
are difficulties with this classification but given the way DIG works, this seems the
most economical way of dealing with cross-category homophones. STRUCTURE-
TYPE is treated as part of lexical information. This models our ability to know al-
most immediately whether a new input belongs to the current structure being built
up or not. In other approaches, this is dealt with strictly as a syntactic phenomenon,
but in DIG the dividing line between lexical and functional information becomes
blurred, given that both aspects of languaging are information-based, rather than
strictly rule-based. The lexical field INDEX must be viewed broadly: basic informa-
tion pertaining to nominal-structures (ns). In many languages, this involves gender,
number and person, but other categories are also possible such as animate, share-
able, visible, class, etc. The field SEM has been denoted with curly brackets and as
an open field to represent an indefinite, open field. There are several reasons for
this: words are very fluid and can acquire significant alterations to their basic se-
mantic field values especially in the case of figurative and/or imaginative language;
also, it is not possible at present to specify exhaustively the semantic properties of
most words. Perhaps it is not even necessary or desirable to do this, given universal
human ability to play with the meaning(s) of words and to create new metaphori-
cal meanings on the fly. In this instance, the optimal rule of specification seems to
be Simon's (1996) notion of "satisficeability", which states that goals or objectives
are satisficed when there is sufficient positive evidence for their resolution and little
negative evidence, and unsaticeficeable when there is sufficient negative evidence
and little positive support for their satisficeability. Thus satisficeability demands a
view of language processing as the attainment of critical thresholds in the on-line
activation of concepts represented as collections of information. A DIG-based the-
ory is explanatorily adequate when it is capable of modelling the languaging ability
and also how this languaging ability develops. The critical difference is that struc-
ture (i.e., syntax), represented in generative grammar as a series of mathematical
abstractions distinct from semantics or pragmatics, is represented in DIG as just
another information parameter interacting with other information parameters and
not as a fundamental and underlying module separate from the other parts of the
languaging faculty.
As we will see shortly, lexical information enters into all information accumu-
lation processes. Let us begin with a simple utterance (9):
(9) My neighbour's cat ate our goldfish last night.
In DIG, utterances are processed word by word beginning from the first. Thus, we
input "My". At this point, "my" is merely a token. It has no information attached
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to it. The first process to be triggered is lexicalization().9 Briefly, this involves a
comparison aga lnst a list of lexical entries until a matching entry is found. to Once
the lexical entI) is found, lexicalization() attaches information to the token. At this
point, it becomt s a word, or a lexicalized token, as represented in (10).
(10) NAME:(m f)
CATEGOR":adjective
INDEX:ge Ider [ ], number [ ], person [+1st?]
STRUCTUI.E-TYPE:[ ] nominal-structure
HEAD?:-
SEM:{O~ NERSHIP: speaker; ... }
So far, not mu( h information has been accumulated. We know (and anticipate)
that a nominal-structure has been initiated. We have virtually no indexical informa-
tion since, in EJlglish, possessive adjectives are unspecified for gender and num-
ber. We also know that this word indicates some form of ownership on the part
of the speaker/\I 'fiter. We should note also that in DIG, within a nominal-structure,
INDEX feature l'erson[ ] refers to the HEAD of the nominal-structure. Hence, the
tentatively speci fied person [+ 1st?] will likely be overridden once the head of the
structure is prolessed. Psychologically, we are now in a position of anticipation:
we expect eithel a modifier of some sort, or a nominal head.
Next, we input and process "neighbour's". For simplicity of exposition, I am
disregarding homophonous readings of spoken neighbours (i.e., "neighbours",
"neighbours "). 'rhis ambiguity would be resolved with the next input, 'cat', since
*"my neighboUJ s cat" is incorrect. Resuming, we lexicalize "neighbour's" and ob-
tain the analysis shown in (11).
(11) NAME:(ne ghbour's)
CATEGOR):common noun: concrete
INDEX:gellder [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTUIlE-TYPE:nominal-structure
HEAD?:-
SEM:{[+011ect],[+human], [+animate], [+ownership], ... }
This is a simpli ication, of course, but there is enough here to illustrate how in-
formation is beiilg accumulated. In DIG, a common operator casts the CATEGORY
value to meet It e needs of the structure being built up. In this case, the seman-
tic feature [+ow; lership] requires that this common noun be recast as an adjective.
This is not a uni versal feature but it is a common one in the grammar of English.
Presumably, in tie initial state, the child is predisposed to accepting any specifica-
tion as normal. I )nce a specification becomes fixed, however, it usually becomes
more difficult to override such specifications as in the case of learning a language
9A pair of pan :ntheses0 is used to indicate a process as opposed to a lexical entry.
lOInthis paper, we will ignore the problem of dealing with a non-occurring match.
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with a (radically) different specification. In French, for instance, this type of CAT-
EGORY casting is much less common. Another feature of DIG which cannot be
fully described in a short paper is the concept of the TEMPO process. Basically,
TEMPO collects all modifying features of a nominal-structure and attaches them
to the HEAD of the structure as soon as it is processed. This feature-accumulating
process is needed in order to account for such utterances as:
(l2) We spent the night in an old, abandoned, rat-infested, stinking, musty, roof-dripping,
disgusting shack ...
where the attributive features accumulated in the chain "old, abandoned, rat-infested,
stinking, musty, roof-dripping, disgusting" are all "held onto" (by being stored in
TEMP) and eventually tagged onto the HEAD "shack". Although languages differ
in their mechanisms for doing feature accumulating and tagging, the process does
seem to be a universal feature of human language and hence of human cognitive
information processing.
At this stage, then, we have the following information accumulated (13):
(13) TEMP:
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTURE-TYPE: nominal-structure
SEM: {OWNERSHIP: speaker, [+object], [+human], [+animate], [+ownership], ... }
Note that the SEM field contains a combination of feature specifications for both
"my" and "neighbour's". Notice also, that some of the INDEX fields have now be-
come specified. If we were interrupted at this point and questioned, we could an-
swer that the utterance concerns the speaker's/writer's neighbour and something or
someone belonging to this particular neighbour.
Continuing, we input "cat" and lexicalize it to obtain the results presented
in (14).
(14) NAME: (cat)
CATEGORY: common noun: concrete
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTURE-TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
SEM: {[+object], [+animate], [+animal], [+feline], ... }
At this point, through the process of unification, TEMP will attach its content to the
word "cat" (15).
(l5) NAME: (cat)
CATEGORY: common noun: concrete
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTURE-TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
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SEM: {OW-l"ERSHIP: speaker, [+object, +modifier], [+human, +modifier],
[+aninlate, +modifier], [+ownership,+modilier], {[+object], [+animate],
[+animal], [+feline], ... } }
It is important te realize that there is very little that is new pertaining to structural
information sinc,: we are still within the initiated nominal-structure. We note, how-
ever, the change,} status to [+modifier] of feature traits attached to "neighbour's".
Although not in,licated here, this change was triggered by the CASTO operator.
There are two gl~neral possible paths normally expected at this point: (a) contin-
ued description. n the form of, say, a relative clause or closure of this structure,
as would be the ;ase in a simple utterance fragment, or (b) the initiation of a new
structure, probab ly a predicate structure. This reflects the common pattern situation
that once we hme a complete structure, we anticipate that it will have a function
of some sort. Me ntally, we are now wondering something like "What about [your]
neighbour's cat?" or a bit more remotely: "which neighbour's cat are you referring
toT' In other wOj'ds, a situation is beginning to take form and we know or at least
we strongly antic ipate that: (a) it will involve the speaker's neighbour's cat, and (b)
it will make a co nment concerning the cat.
It can be asked whether these anticipations are legitimate and if so, what gave
rise to them? It i; one of the claims behind DIG that part of the "primary linguis-
tic data" from w]lich a child derives its language involves a large number of these
situations, called "localized contexts" in DIG. The situations themselves are not
necessarily boun i to any particular structural form. However, actual language ac-
tivity must be via a concrete language and with increasing instances and situational
repetitions, situa ions and formal patterns become (strongly) associated with the
result that eventl ally pattern mastery and overlearning result. After this, patterns
become fossilize,} and parameters become set. Once the initial state becomes set,
two complement; lry phenomena occur: (a) the speaker finds it more difficult to ex-
press a well-knovrn cognitive local context in a pattern different from the one which
has become fixed, and (b) slight nuances in the cognitive structure of the cognitive
local context are olurred due to the "satificeability principle". All of this is normal
development sine e we effect languaging at a considerable rate and cannot afford
to re-analyze anc map formal patterns onto local contexts every time we need to
do so. Moreover, it appears that local contexts and their formal expression(s) are
not in a one-to-Oj Ie relationship. Some contexts may be so rare as to elude formal
expression; other; may have several expressions for essentially the same local con-
text. Once again, we seem to be faced with providing satisficeable results rather
than absolutely p.'ecise, fully specified conditions.
If we continu e our input with "ate", we have, following lexicalization(), a word
whose CATEGOR{ value is incompatible with nominal-structure. This will trigger
closure of the neminal-structure "my neighbour's cat" and initiate a new struc-
ture type: verb-s ructure. Among the properties of verb-structure is the need to
fulfill several rol ;s: subject, complement and object. The word "ate" is derived
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from "eat(nsl, {ns2}, {complement})", where nsl and ns2 are assigned certain
functional roles. In English, it turns out that nsl is assigned the subject role and
ns2 the object role. In some languages, the nominal-structures may be marked for
functional roles as in Latin or Russian, while in others, word order or even par-
ticles will be used to indicate such roles. The underlying fact is that, regardless
of language, verb-structures are marked lexically as requiring certain parametric
functional roles. Traditionally, these roles have been studied in isolation but there
is growing consensus that functional role information overlaps lexical. information
(cf. Schalley 2004). If this is correct, then part of what a child acquires through
exposure, possibly as an innate part of its "language organ", is an instinctive recog-
nition of a fundamental distinction between nominal-structures and verb-structures.
This is another claim being explored in DIG. Among the unexpected results to date
is the growing understanding that functional roles are simply part of the informa-
tion accumulation which goes on during the languaging process. This allows us
to represent functional roles in terms of the same features which are used to de-
scribe lexical items. Feature structure compatibility and specification become the
criteria by which functional roles are either assigned or blocked. In the latter case,
the utterance is said to be ungrammatical in terms of one or more of a set of in-
compatibilities. It could be incompatibility in INDEX values, or SEM{ ... } values.
There could even be structural incompatibility (see Sevigny 2000, 2002a, 2004 for
examples).
When "ate" is lexicalized, we have several things happen. First, the current
nominal-structure is closed and receives an attachment of a set of functional roles
compatible with nominal-structures. These include among others: subject, direct
object, object of a preposition, topic, appositive, subjective completion, etc. There
are about a dozen or so functional roles compatible with nominal-structures. Again,
these roles appear to belong to universal grammar since they seem to occur in all hu-
man languages, with occasional variations here and there. Then, the verb-structure
is initiated. Included in its lexical information is the fact that it requires at least one
nominal-structure marked [+animate], among other things because "eat(nsl, {ns2},
{complement})" requires that nsl be animate and ns2, if it occurs, to be compati-
ble with the SEM feature [+edible]. Where does this information come from? DIG
claims that accumulation and storage of such features is part and parcel of a child's
"primary linguistic data". For instance, it is not uncommon for a child to claim that
its cat "ate its teddy bear" because the child has not yet learned the rule concerning
eater and edible objects referred to above. Thus, part of a child's "primary linguistic
data" includes storage and application of an open set of SEM features, as well as
lexical and functional information associated with lexical items. I I
We may now input "our", whose CATEGORY value is nominal-structure. This is
II It seems highly likely that SEM { ... } features can be put into a mapping relation with
neuronal sequence sets as described in Pulvermuller (2003). This is one of the areas of
current interest in the DIG approach. We hope to arrive at positive results in the near future.
'.:
157
LINGUlSTICA I.TLANTICA No. 25, 2004
incompatible wi:h the current verb-structure and therefore triggers closure of verb-
structure and in ,tiates a second nominal-structure. With the closing of the verb-
structure, it beci lmes possible to specify a possible functional role for the closed
nominal-structure. In this case, because of factors specific to English grammar, the
most likely cand [date role is subject. Since "cat" is marked [+animate], among other
things, and since it is indexically compatible with "ate(ns1, {ns2}, {complement}),
it can and does l nify with the verb-structure's first nominal argument and assumes
the role of "subject". This triggers a local context which in turn brings in other
informational pa rameters. We can schematize the information accumulated to date,
as in (16).
(16) SITUATION: Doer: ns1:::: (our neighbour's CAThead)
NAME: (cal)
CATEGORY: common noun: concrete
INDEX: gerder [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTUR E-TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
SEM: {OW>JERSHIP: speaker, [+object, +modifier], [+human, +modifier],
[+anintate, +modifier], [+ownership,+modifier], {[+object], [+animate],
[+aninlal], [+feline], ... } }
EVENT: eat ns1[+animate], {ns2[+edibleJ}, {complement})
COMPLEMI NT: ?
In DIG, local COlltexts are represented with Situation-schernas. It is another claim
of DIG that a child's "primary linguistic data" involves exposure to a large store
of situations. On;e a situation structure has become fixed, it lends itself readily to
anticipation and lence speeds up the process of processing incoming information,
a necessary requi site condition if we are to maintain normal communication within
real-time constn ints. It is interesting to note that everything slows drastically if
either the situati. m developing is new to the listener as would be the case if the
topic of discussic n were unfamiliar or if the words being input were not found in the
listener's/reader',: lexical database. It is also worthwhile noticing that commonsense
knowledge and vlorld knowledge are involved during the process of local context
specifications ancIresolutions. As a child becomes more familiar with his/her world,
all information aJ'eas are expanded.
Finally, let u; skip ahead a bit and process "goldfish last night". This will yield
the following updated Situation (17):
(17) SITUATION: Doer: ns1 = (our neighbour's CAThead)
NAME: (cat)
CATEGORY: common noun: concrete
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rd]
STRUCTURE- TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
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SEM: {OWNERSHIP: speaker, [+object, +modifierj, [+human,
+modifier], [+animate, +modifier], [+ownership, +modifierj,
{[+objectj, [+animate], [+animal], [+felinej, ... } }
EVENT: eat(n51[ +animatej, , n52[ +edible], (nominal-structure3modifiertime:past)[ +pastj
OBJECT: n52 = (my goldfishhead)
CATEGORY: common noun: concrete
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rdj
STRUCTURE- TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
SEM: {OWNERSHIP: speaker, [+object, +modifier], [+human,
+modifier], [+animate, +modifier], [+ownership, +modifierj
[+object], [+animal], [+fish], [+animate], [+edible], ... }
COMPLEMENT: n53 = (last nighthead)
CATEGORY: common noun: abstract
INDEX: gender [ ], number [+sg], person [+3rdj
STRUCTURE-TYPE: nominal-structure
HEAD?: +
SEM: {[+object], [+time], {[+past], ... }
The final input is the period (".") which, in DIG, is one of several terminators. Ter-
minators trigger complete closure which, in turn, triggers several mop-up processes
the final result of which is the generation of a discourse unit with additional infor-
mation parameters. These parameters, among others, indicate the general type of
information which has just been generated. For instance, it could be narration, de-
scription, argumentation. Given that the exact nature of these general categories
can be problematic, but less so if viewed from the perspective of satisficeability,
DIG usually labels these information parameters using composite terms such as
description-narration if the lexicalized words making up the discourse unit consist
mostly of descriptive words rather than of words denoting action and flow of time.
5. EXPLANATORY ADEQUACY, GRAMMATICALITY AND STRATEGIES
Earlier, we mentioned that Chomsky (2000: 7) wrote of descriptive adequacy in
terms of "a full and accurate account of the properties of the language" which a
speaker uses. He continued and explained that this amounted to detailing "what the
speaker of that particular language knows" (p. 8). However, as we noted earlier, the
expressions "a full and accurate account of the properties of a language" and "what
the speaker of that particular language knows" are very abstract. What is meant
by these expressions is not at all clear. We need to concretize such expressions in
order to be able to build models with which to predict languaging outcomes and
performances. The information-based approach developed in DIG brings some of
these needed concrete deta~ls to language theory.
159
LiNGUISTICA ATLANTICA No. 25, 2004
Assuming t lat the work presented in section 4.1 is correct, we now have at
least a working model with which to explore both descriptive adequacy and ex-
planatory adequ. ICY. Thinking about languaging as a function of information pro-
cessing, memor;' and storage brings about a shift in focus in linguistic theorizing
away from synt; x proper towards strategies for gauging and channeling the flow
of information i I discourse. This allows us to list and briefly comment on a few
feasible properti ~sof the language faculty, which would appear to include at least
the following (11:):
(18) a. The ab: lily to store information in lexical entries which can become networked
to yielc structural, functional, contextual, semantic and discourse information.
Such in formational knowledge accumulation is not hardwired; rather, it is the re-
sult of I~xperience. We also note that a lot of this information can be represented
in term; of feature bundles which are usually of a binary nature although there
can be Iligher arities. Moreover, a lot of information is unspecified by default but
open to specification as soon as local contexts and/or functional relations become
specifiable. Such an approach implies that there is no actual line of division be-
tween syntax and semantics, nor even necessarily with pragmatics, a claim which
support; Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory (1994).
b. Anothe' property of language is the innate orientation of the linguistic neophyte
toward he recognition, construction and storage of localized context situations.
It is a claim of DIG that a person masters hislher language in terms of such an
accumu lation oflocalized contexts and their accompanying mappings onto over-
learned patterns. It is also a claim that these localized contexts or situational con-
structs ;Ire universal in so far as they can be observed at work in every normal
human ianguage. In all probability, they form part of human perceptual and orga-
nization al structures and limits. In essence, DIG claims that human information
expressi on is limited to such situational schemas.12
c. A third Jroperty oflanguage is our universal use of patterns which become over-
learned because of their limits and frequency. Such a claim can be easily tested
because it states that if a speaker encounters an unusual context, situational con-
struct OJ unusual pattern, then processing will slow down, possibly even be tem-
porarily rejected as "incorrect".
d. A fourtt property oflanguage lies in our universal ability to create metaphor from
context, a natural emergent property resulting from our innate predisposition to
view inl Jrmation accumulations in terms of fixed, overlearned localized contexts.
e. A fifth IJroperty of language lies in the special status of functional roles which
are: (a) ::ubject to structural patterns which become overlearned, and (b) effected
subject 10 compatible feature specifications. Common mechanisms at work here
are WOf( Iorder, functional endings on words, use of particles. The neophyte does
not kno'v that word order is important in English, that functional endings are
importaJlt in Russian or particles are important in Japanese. As Chomsky would
say, the! e are mere idiosyncracies. The interesting points are two: (a) that these
mechani sms are quite limited, and (b) that they are quickly seized upon. Indeed,
12See below for;: further implication of this claim.
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the rapidity with which first language learning takes place certainly reduces the
possibility that functional properties of language are open ended in terms of the
number and type which could be expected were the mind a linguistic tabula rasa.
The short list presented in (18) represents an incomplete, but measurable set of lan-
guage properties. If it can be established that properties of this nature are indeed
the bricks and mortar of language, then we can get on with the business of devel-
oping models which will eventually encompass unknown implications and further
properties of language.
With regard to Chomsky's remarks on explanatory adequacy, namely that a
theory of language with this property can show how each particular language can
be derived from a uniform initial state under the "boundary conditions" set by ex-
perience, we note that the situational contexts described in section 4.1 and further
commented upon in (18c) are clearly abstract constructs common to all languages
regardless of a particular language's concrete structure and lexicon and that humans
acquire these situational constructs at an astonishing rate and at a surprisingly slow
rate when it comes to acquiring another language later in life. These observations
lead us to theorize that part of the "boundary conditions" faced by experience re-
quire that (a) languaging be done in terms of information gathering, processing,
storage and generating, and (b) that once experience sets in, the "boundary condi-
tions" result in patterns which effect mappings between patterns, information and
situational schema closures. A further claim hinted at above is that this kind of in-
formation is innate to humans in general and seems to be a conceptual limit of the
species. As far as "idiosyncratic" varieties are concerned, this simply reduces to
the observation that it does not matter how and in what order situational schemas
become filled. It is also worthy of note that once these schemas and their realiza-
tions become fixed (or overlearned), they can be processed more easily and more
rapidly, a necessary property if people are to communicate within stringent time
limitations.
Finally, we note that we have already initiated a reply to Chomsky's third ques-
tion where he asks why language properties are the way they are. DIG answers that
once we look at language from its fundamental purpose rather than from its struc-
ture or origin, we see that the properties examined briefly in this paper fall into
place if information is to be acquired and processed within realistic real-time lim-
its. It seems that humans do not think in terms of structures. Rather, they think
in terms of overlearned patterns which themselves are merely mappings of highly
similar situational and informational schemas concatenated and networked into dis-
course streams. Far from abstracting a complex grammar from an "incomplete set
of data", the child is barraged by a steady flow of thousands of (repeated) and/or
similar situational contexts. Eventually, overlearning occurs, habits set in and gen-
erate overlearned patterns which are used to anticipate other situational develop-
ments, most of which turn out to be correct. From all of this experience, the child
acquires the system, or the grammar.
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6. CONCLUSI<J NS
No. 25, 2004
When informati, m - including its representation and its patterns of flow - is taken
as the principal perspective from which to study language, a new outlook for lin-
guistic enquiry f )llows naturally. One of the requirements of this new outlook is that
'information" b{ defined in a manner compatible with the process of languaging. In
this paper, we hlve shown, though only in a cursory fashion, that from the perspec-
tive of languagi !lg, information comes from several traditional domains: lexical,
functional, struc tural, situational, pragmatic and discursive. Furthermore, we have
also shown that it can be captured using a consistent set of complex feature-value
pairs, subject to a small number of simple operators and organizational principles,
notable among v'hich are networking of verified, compatible feature specifications.
As regards representational phenomena, there are two main generic ways in-
formation accun lulation could be described: (a) as a set of multilayers where each
layer i acts as th e base for the next layer i+ I which, in turn, "defines" the lower
layer; and (b) by incremental growth through accumulation and networking of pos-
sible relations aJId/or specifications, subject to consistency and compatibility con-
straints. DIG ha! focused on the latter approach because it seemed more natural
to a realistic accounting of such information accumulation because of constraints
imposed by natural, dynamic, linear, time-constrained processing.
Several sug! ;estions were also made indicating that language processing and/or
acquisition may involve considerable cognitive activity. This led to a third hypoth-
esis: namely, tha. it may turn out to be possible to establish precise connections be-
tween such cogn itive activities with brain activities using mappings based on neu-
ronal sequence s,:ts. A fourth area that seems promising, though highly speculative
at present, is the possibility of coming to grips with how words might be stored. A
fifth area which .llso seems very promising is the conception of language in terms
of cognitive infcrmational networking achieved via localized contexts, each with
a definite structl! re, yet originally based on potential mappings onto actual utter-
ances. Should su;h a hypothesis turn out to be correct, it would be consistent with
the commonplac ~observation that physical organs used in the production of lan-
guage do not ap~ear to have been originally designed for such activity. An indirect
consequence of s lIch a discovery would be a (partial) vindication that language fol-
lowed cognitive ,levelopment as claimed, for instance, by Bickerton (1990, 1995)
and Deacon (19~'7). Finally, it is worth noting that language layering cannot ac-
count for language activity simply because such activity is primarily an activity of
information accu mulation and organization rather than a set of rule-based abstrac-
tions operating it dependently of contextual information.
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